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Argument, Political Friendship and
Rhetorical Knowledge: A Review of
Garver's For the Sake of Argument
Francis J. Mootz III*
Gene Garver's book, For the Sake of Argument, responds to the
dilemma at the core of contemporary legal theory. "Reason," Garver
charges, too "often seems either impotent or dangerous, or both."'
Reason appears impotent to the extent that we maintain its rigor by
limiting its scope to dialectical demonstration, as epitomized by
mathematics. Circumscribed in this manner, reason quickly loses any
efficacy in resolving social conflicts through legal practice, because these
disputes simply are not subject to the rational demonstration of an
eternally and universally correct answer. But if we extend the scope of
reason it suddenly appears dangerous; unhinged from having to provide
definitive answers, reason threatens to become nothing more than
sophistic manipulation of pre-given and conflicting interests. Finding the
mean between these unsatisfactory poles is the holy grail of social and
political philosophy, and Garver promises no less than an account of how
we can reason about legal disputes in a polysemic, multi-cultural world.
Garver's return to Aristotle might appear highly suspect. Given that
we no longer inhabit the polis, Aristotle's analysis of public deliberation
appears to be rubbing salt in our modem wound. But Garver does not
return only to the Aristotle of the Nicomachean Ethics that garners so
much attention in the literature on practical reasoning. Garver's insight
* Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law. The first part of this
essay originally was presented as part of a panel at the Annual Meeting of the
Association for the Study of Law, Culture & the Humanities, convened at the University
of Connecticut School of Law in March, 2004 to review a pre-publication draft of Gene
Garver's book, For the Sake of Argument. An earlier version of the second part of this
essay originally was presented as part of the conference, "Rhetoric and Democracy:
About an African Athens," at the University of Cape Town in June, 2004. I thank my
fellow panelists at both events, and the audiences, for their comments and questions. In
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conversations with me over the years on these topics.
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is that practical reasoning emerges from persuasion, and persuasion is the
product of rhetorical engagement within a community. His thesis is that
Aristotle's Rhetoric "shows how reason can be contingent, emotional,
and interested without ceasing to be rational."3 He concludes that we can
rediscover the character of legal reasoning by connecting Aristotle's
account of rhetoric with Aristotle's insistence on the distinct integrity of
practical reasoning.4
Garver locates the critical link between rhetoric and practical
reasoning in the paired notions of character and community. Aristotle
reveals that rhetoric is an "art of character, ' '5 and carrying character
forward into the public deliberations of practical reasoning engenders
community, or what might be termed social character. This tack is not
particularly comforting, since character and community appear to be in
short supply in the modem world. But this is precisely Garver's point: it
is only through reasoning together that character and community
develop.6 There is a constitutive and reciprocal relationship between
character/community and the social practices of reason.
Garver's book consists of four paired chapters, with each pair
providing first a practical examination and then a theoretical elaboration.
Chapters One and Two argue that persuasion is at the root of practical
reasoning, drawing upon the experience of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission to defend the idea that persuasion can be
more than mere sophistic manipulation. Chapters Three and Four extend
this argument by showing that persuasion rests on character and
community rather than solely on logical imperatives, working from the
constitutional landmark, Brown v. Board of Education.7 Chapters Five
and Six explore the genesis of character and community in the practical
engagement of persuasive reasoning. Finally, Chapters Seven and Eight
explore the potential for practical reasoning through rhetorical
engagement despite society's heterogeneous character and our polity's
pluralistic and democratic features.
In Part One of this review essay I briefly recount Garver's
elaboration of these four themes. Law is an organized effort to subsume
its rhetorical construction under hypothesized rationalistic structures, and
so Garver's incisive descriptions of the constitutive role of rhetoric in our
democratic society is a significant addition to the literature. In Part Two,
I undertake a (friendly) critical analysis of Garver's themes and suggest
2. Id. at6.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 6-8.
5. EUGENE GARVER, ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC: AN ART OF CHARACTER (1995).
6. GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, supra note 1, at 4.
7. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
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that my account of "rhetorical knowledge" supplements and expands his
insights. I consider this to be the highest form of praise: it is not easy to
write a challenging and engaging book that provides the basis for readers
to develop one's important insights in so many fruitful ways.
I. Garver's For The Sake OfArgument: The Rhetorical Construction
of Law and Legal Practice
Garver's four paired chapters work through a carefully selected set
of legal issues to illuminate the principles of rhetorical reasoning at work
and to point the way toward improving these rhetorical practices. His
first theme is that persuasion is a form of reasoning together with another
person, rather than overwhelming the other through the force of one's
demonstration. Garver begins by noting that the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) stands as an affront to the modem
liberal dogma that politics is an elaborate agreement among strangers
who are pursuing competing life plans and wish only to structure a
neutral playing field. The TRC gave voice to truths-multiple, fractured,
and competing, though they might be-in the service of a constitutive
reconciliation. This political exercise built a community from the ground
up through rhetorical exchange, generating a staying power that could
not follow from a political compromise in the war of all against all. The
TRC illustrates the animating thesis of Garver's book: "Through
political friendship, practical reason can aim at truth while staying
committed to public argument because ethical arguments can be more
powerful and more rational than arguments from reason alone .. .8
South African constitutionalism required more than a logical elucidation
of the principles of good government, and the TRC provided a forum for
some modicum of political friendship to permit the new country to begin
to take shape. This is not pie-in-the-sky communitarianism, in which
politically desirable results naturally follow from talking together.
Efforts to build community might serve to isolate and ostracize
"outsiders," just as rhetoric can be used to bring an audience to engage in
violence. But linking persuasion and reasoning makes it possible to
understand the halting and fragile possibilities of social reason.
Although there is no definitive methodology to distinguish
persuasion from sophistic, Garver emphasizes that persuasion is
fundamental and sophistic is parasitic. First, manipulation works best
when the victim believes that she has been persuaded, and perhaps the
very nature of sophistic is to induce a feeling that one has been
persuaded through reasonable argument. Second, the sophist has no
8. GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, supra note 1, at 27.
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basis for claiming that a particular audience is inept, or that the result of
deliberations has resulted in the "wrong" decision. Sophistic is wholly
defined by its result, rather than by elements of rationality internal to the
practice. Garver concludes that sophistic simply cannot stand alone and
that persuasion as a reasonable activity is primary.
Garver's second theme is the inevitable role of character in
persuading another person. He analyzes Brown v. Board of Education as
an example of how practical reasoning is properly considered reason, and
not just a second-best activity after genuine reason runs out. The opinion
in Brown embodies ethos because the persuasive force of the opinion
extends beyond the narrow logos of the role of education in modem
society and embraces an evolving commitment to the anti-discrimination
principle. "The meaning of Brown-its ethos-survives in the ethical
surplus of the argument," 9 by which Garver means that its ethos outstrips
the logical force of the opinion. This does not mean that character exists
independently of logic, but rather that they both are important elements
in deliberation about matters which can be otherwise. "Ethical argument
is never illogical. It depends on logic, and then goes beyond what it is
logically authorized to conclude."' 0
The role of character in legal argumentation is not a gloss, then, but
is constitutive. Despite the overt rhetorical conventions of judges and
lawyers, there can be no strictly logical arguments that are persuasive.
"Aristotle attributes to both practical wisdom and to the art of rhetoric
the ability to apprehend and treat rationally particulars that seem beyond
the reach of reason,"" and it is precisely this expansive understanding of
the role of reasoning and social deliberation illustrated by Brown.
The third theme of Garver's book is the source of ethical authority.
Garver turns to an argumentative failure to explore his thesis that the
most authoritative ethos is generated in persuasive argumentation. By
citing Dred Scott12 in the course of arguing that the principles of Brown
should not extend to the District of Columbia, the government's lawyer
committed an egregious error. How could the lawyer "have done
anything so obtuse? I think the most reasonable hypothesis is that he
mistakenly supposed that the Court's decision was a logical one, rather
than an ethical one .... 3 Garver's point is that arguing for a logical
extension of legal authority fails if it is not ethical, and that the ethos of
the speaker is therefore a product of her willingness to engage in
dialogue oriented toward persuasion.
9. Id. at 74.
10. Id. at 86.
11. Id. at 106.
12. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
13. GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, supra note 1, at 118.
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Although Aristotle's Rhetoric provides a wealth of detail on how to
persuade others, Garver notes that Aristotle is silent on how to be
persuaded. Looking to Aristotle's notion of political friendship, Garver
contends that the friendly relations engendered in public discourse
provide a space in which citizens can both persuade and be persuaded.
This activity generates an ethos of argument that permits persons to trust
their own claims, as well as trust those with whom they deliberate. The
attorney arguing Bolling v. Sharpe14 breached the trust embodied in
social reason by failing to be reasonable; he did so by being rigidly
logical and ignoring the ethical dimension of legal persuasion.
Garver rounds out his first three themes in the final two chapters.
He asserts that we can avoid the age-old debate between rhetoric and
philosophy by recognizing the ethical dimension of practical reason,
which is shown not only in the rhetor's character but also in the public's
communal ethos.
This vision of constitutional hermeneutics, rhetoric, and practical
wisdom, in which pluralism, the internal ends of argument, and the
ethical dimensions of argument develop together, is ethically superior
to the more popular sophistical and philosophical constructions of
constitutional interpretation. The latter two pretend that the
superiority of their position is metaphysical, not ethical.15
Pluralism means that argumentation will never cease. But when ethical
rhetoric is viewed in terms of the forms of argument rather than the
goal-in terms of legitimacy rather than abstract justice-we achieve
sufficient room for the development of character and the maintenance of
community. Ethos permits practical rationality to be "self-sustaining and
fully rational."'
16
Garver argues that public reason cannot be fully institutionalized in
democratic bodies or judicial tribunals. "To try to make the rationality of
reasoning about ends into a method, or to offer it an institutional home, is
like trying to devise a method for creativity or for friendship."' 7
Although he endorses Dewey's celebration of the scientific ethos in
which argumentation rises above unavoidable personal interests and
agendas, he acknowledges that risk and uncertainty are inevitable. "Like
the autonomy of science, the autonomy of practical reason is always in
danger of becoming self-isolation. The identity I have relied on, between
pistis as referring to a trustworthy speaker, a cogent argument, and a
14. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
15. GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, supra note 1, at 174.
16. Id. at 185.
17. Id. at 189.
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convinced audience, depends on the autonomy of practical reason."''
8
Practical reasoning is not a scientific enterprise, because it is not oriented
toward compelling, universal truths. It is an exercise of character within
a community that cannot be scripted in advance, and therefore requires
the participants to place more at risk.
[T]he contemporary fact of pluralism creates new opportunities and
dangers for the autonomy of practical reason. The existence of
competing arguments and incommensurable values reminds us that
rhetorical arguments lack the kind of necessity that purely logical
arguments sometimes have. The lack of conclusiveness seems to
open up the possibilities of arbitrariness, of determination by
something other than argument, and so leads us back to my earlier
questions about whether there was really any difference between
reasoning and rationalizing. We can only make such a distinction to
the extent that we engage in practical reasoning for its own sake and
not solely for the results it may bring. If we model practical
reasoning on science and theoretical reasoning, conflict is a sign of
failure. If practical reasoning is autonomous, then rationality can
lead to conflict as easily and as rationally as to consensus.
9
Garver optimistically charts the potential of practical reason, even as he
honestly acknowledges the challenges we face in making rhetorical
argument a centerpiece of our social lives when it is all too easily
misconstrued as being dangerous, impotent, or both.
II. The Role of Rhetorical Knowledge
I wish to build on Garver's insights by arguing that we can gain
"rhetorical knowledge" in addition to merely employing "rhetorical
technique," and that "rhetorical knowledge" is more robust than Garver's
Aristotelian account of rhetoric. 20 Rhetorical theorists celebrate the role
of rhetoric in building community, but pay less attention to describing
the kind of community that must exist in order for rhetoric to get off the
ground as an epistemic activity. Garver's focus on ethos and community
provides important guidance in this project. Rhetoric is epistemic only
by virtue of its character as a social practice; in order to describe how
rhetorical engagement produces knowledge we must explain the social
prerequisites for successful rhetoric and also recognize its socially
constitutive results. Exposing these connections illustrates the critical
18. Id. at 200.
19. Id. at 201.
20. I develop an account of "rhetorical knowledge" in detail in a forthcoming book,
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III, RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE iN LEGAL PRACTICE AND CRITICAL
LEGAL THEORY (2006).
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role of rhetorical knowledge in democratic governance.
I approach this subject with two biases. First, it will come as no
surprise that as a lawyer and a law professor my primary interest is the
role of legal actors and institutions in generating rhetorical knowledge,
and also that I regard legal practice as exemplary for other rhetorical
venues. Although he is a philosopher, Garver's book displays a nuanced
understanding of the significance of legal argumentation, and I wish to
reaffirm his account, from the inside as it were. Second, I approach legal
theory from the hermeneutical tradition, primarily the "philosophical
hermeneutics" of Hans-Georg Gadamer. I am most concerned with
investigating how legal texts embody meaning over time and with
justifying our faith that law can be text-based without degenerating into
an historicist-archival practice. My hermeneutical orientation naturally
has brought me to consider the intertwined role of persuasion and
understanding, to investigate the mutually implicating practices of
rhetorical engagement and hermeneutical discernment. By coming to
rhetoric from hermeneutics, though, I believe that it is possible to
develop the issues raised in Garver's book and to augment contemporary
debates in rhetorical theory more generally.
My thesis is that legal argumentation yields rhetorical knowledge
only to the extent that it is both hermeneutical and rhetorical in nature,
and that Garver's book provides an important touchstone from which to
elaborate this claim. We can fully understand and promote the role of
rhetoric in practical reasoning, and the civic friendship that both subtends
and follows from reasoning together, only by acknowledging the
hermeneutical dimension of this rhetorical activity. After describing my
conception of rhetorical knowledge, I discuss how this concept might be
used productively to extend aspects of Garver's argument.
A. Rhetorical Knowledge as Epistemic and Ethical
I could join Garver in using the more familiar term, "practical
reason," but instead I use the more provocative term "rhetorical
knowledge" precisely because it is unsettling. It is all too easy to
construe "practical reasoning" as an individual activity, as something one
might do when thinking through one of life's dilemmas in the solitary
dark of the night. But even when a person employs practical reason in
this solitary setting, she remains enmeshed in a social activity. "Practical
reason" is not an individual faculty for engaging in self-reflection about
how to proceed as much as the accumulated effects of having reasoned
together with others over one's lifetime. 21 I use the term "rhetorical
21. Chris Smith has made this hermeneutical point forcefully, emphasizing that "we
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knowledge" to foreground the social and argumentative root of practical
reason.
The bias of the modem age is to equate knowledge with the logical
foundations of modem science and to characterize nonscientific
discourses as "mere" aesthetics, self-expression, or hortatory moralizing.
Rhetorical knowledge refers to the knowledge that emerges from
historical and social situations that remain dynamic and contingent.
Although rhetorical knowledge is a social achievement rather than purely
an intellectual accomplishment, it is knowledge. We can know the
requirements of justice and we can know the solutions to mathematical
problems; it is just the case that our knowledge of justice is rhetorical
rather than logical.
Although the starting points for rhetorical knowledge are the flux of
lived existence and the preunderstandings embedded in patterns of social
discourse and interaction, rhetorical knowledge is distinguished from
habit or convention by its inventive representation and reinscription of
these prejudices. Surveying accepted topics, norms, and opinions as
resources for confronting the demands of the present, rhetorical actors
continually conjoin these constitutive features of themselves and their
society in unique ways. A reconfiguration of communal images can
dramatically challenge received wisdom and impel an audience to see a
matter in new light-consider the appeal to American democratic
traditions in Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech-but it
would be a mistake to regard these relatively rare limit cases as
paradigms of rhetorical knowledge because doing so can obscure the
everyday role of rhetorical knowledge. Garver points to the work of the
TRC in building a new democratic society in South Africa, but we
cannot permit the intense drama of the TRC's work to limit the range of
never think in wordless ideas, but only in the words we have first heard from others and
then hear again in our thinking." P. Christopher Smith, The Uses of Aristotle in
Gadamer's Recovery of Consultative Reasoning: Sunesis, Sungn6md, Epieikeia, and
Sumbouleuesthai, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731, 741 (2000). He explains:
In other words, language, audible speech, is not invented by private individuals
to signify thoughts they already have but is the gift of the community that
allows the individual to think in the first place. Not cogito ergo sum ["I think,
therefore I am"] is the truth of the matter, rather loquimur ergo cogito ["We
speak, therefore I think"].
Id. at 736.
Writing as a psychoanalyst, clinical psychologist and psychotherapist, Peter Hobson
argues that thinking is rooted in our social existence. He concludes that "the tools of
thought are constructed on the basis of an infant's emotional engagement with other
people. To put it bluntly, if an infant were not involved with other people, then she
would not come to think.... Without the right kind of social engagement, intellectual
development can proceed only so far." PETER HOBSON, THE CRADLE OF THOUGHT:
EXPLORING THE ORIGINS OF THINKING xiv, 274 (2004).
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constitutive rhetorical practices. Philippe Salazar's assessment of the
role of rhetoric in the shaping of democracy in South Africa is instructive
in this regard: he not only analyzes highly publicized and dramatic
speeches by Archbishop Tutu and Nelson Mandela, he also explores the
creation of democratic culture through the rhetorical significance of
sports, popular publications, and physical spaces.
22
My use of "invention" and "refashioning" to describe rhetorical
activity is potentially misleading because it brings to mind an image of a
skilled technician adjusting the rhetorical bonds of society as one might
adjust a fuel injection system to maximize engine performance. The
distinctiveness of rhetorical knowledge is that it does not service pre-
given ends. As praxis exhibiting phronesis rather than poiesis exhibiting
techne, rhetorical exchanges redefine the criteria for assessing their
accomplishments in the course of creating knowledge. Rhetorical
reasoning is a reciprocal activity that depends on the existence of an
ethical relationship between the speaker and audience, in which neither
wholly surrenders to, nor subordinates, the interests of the other. This
ethical relationship is not grounded in a shared criterion of judgment, but
rather is a shared space in which multiple criteria may be jointly
proposed, tested, and employed.
A concrete example may help to explain the concept. Rhetorical
knowledge figures prominently in the contentious "debate" in America
over affirmative action. This intemperate political, social and legal battle
over the legitimacy of seeking to achieve the full participation of
previously excluded minorities in communal life would appear to be the
last feature of civic life that exhibits rhetorical knowledge. Unlike the
remaking of South African life in the transition to democracy, the
American battle over affirmative action appears to shroud self-serving
political gamesmanship with the use of a coded vocabulary. But this is a
good example precisely because it uncovers the provisional, halting, and
dynamic nature of rhetorical knowledge.
The competing slogans of equality ("color-blind" treatment of all
citizens in all respects) and fairness ("leveling the playing field" for
historically disadvantaged groups) are deployed in rhetorical exchanges
that can produce rhetorical knowledge. It is obvious in some instances
that these slogans are wielded strategically, but the worst abuses of
rhetorical practices prove the case for rhetorical knowledge. Those
seeking to segregate and denigrate disadvantaged minorities could use
the physical coercion of an apartheid regime to secure their goal, just as
those seeking to mitigate the economic power of the majority could
22. PHILIPPE-JOSEPH SALAZAR, AN AFRICAN ATHENS: RHETORIC AND THE SHAPING OF
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA (2002).
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incite a violent revolution in furtherance of their aims. However, the
debate about affirmative action continues, even if sub-optimally, by
traversing the many discourses within society in order to align points of
shared agreement into new constellations of meaning. Advocates seek
the adherence of specific audiences (in the faculty meeting, for instance),
of hypothetical constructions of specific yet dispersed audiences (in
Presidential politics, for instance), and of the hypothetical universal
audience of all reasonable persons (in the formulation of political-ethical
theories, for instance) in a manner of communication that is derivative of
conversational exchange. The reality of rhetorical knowledge is proved
not because the participants unanimously agree on the uniquely correct
answer to the question posed, but because they continue to develop the
public discussion along new and more productive lines of argumentation
in response to a changing social reality.
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases-one upholding the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policies and the
other declaring the University of Michigan's undergraduate affirmative
action policies illegal 23-provide competing opinions that reveal how
legal practice is grounded in rhetorical knowledge and is not simply a
matter of providing a dialectical elaboration of fixed principles, nor a
wholly unreasoning exercise of power. The multiple opinions in the two
cases elaborate the contemporary implications of the famous "diversity"
rationale for affirmative action articulated in Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in the Bakke24 case, reinvigorating the topoi of that opinion in the
context of the role of higher education in American life some twenty-five
years later. The cases present a tangled mess when viewed through the
lens of logical analysis, but when viewed rhetorically they represent a
contingent and ongoing process of social reasoning that open avenues of
thinking even as they create cul-de-sacs that might calcify the debate.
The opinions are not rhetorical failures for embodying the underlying
conflict between equality and fairness, because the conflict is
unavoidable. The measure of the opinions is whether their engagement
with the intractable oppositions raised by affirmative action is persuasive
23. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Supreme Court held that the
Michigan Law School's consideration of race as part of a holistic review of each
applicant's file was constitutional because the consideration was for the purpose of
admitting a diverse student body for the educational benefit of all students. In Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the Supreme Court distinguished Grutter and held that
the University of Michigan's practice of granting twenty points out of a maximum of one
hundred fifty points to under-represented minority undergraduate applicants was
unconstitutional because the minority applicant's race became, in effect, a decisive factor
in the admissions decision.
24. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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and leads to future elaboration. Legal commentators agree that the legal
landscape changed after these cases; my point is that the change is not
only political, it is epistemic.
The space constraints of this short review essay preclude a detailed
rhetorical analysis of these opinions,25 but this example should be
suggestive enough of what I mean by the term "rhetorical knowledge" to
support my emendation of Garver's thesis. I bring the theory of
rhetorical knowledge to bear on Garver's analysis by developing two
related topics: an account of audience that captures the socially
constitutive features of rhetorical knowledge founded on political
friendship, and a hermeneutical account of this political friendship that
explores the social prerequisite of rhetorical knowledge.
B. Rhetorical Knowledge, Audience and Legal Argumentation.
Garver argues that rhetorical reasoning charts a path between
dialectical demonstration and sophistic manipulation because it involves
a deliberative exchange founded on the participants' characters and
friendly relationships. Noting that Aristotle's Rhetoric pays insufficient
attention to the circumstances of friendship, Garver insists that it is
necessary to supplement rhetorical advice about speaking effectively
with advice on how the audience can listen well.26 He concludes:
The ability to express ethical arguments and the ability to hear
persuasive appeals as ethical arguments are among the chief
circumstances of friendship.... Of course there are practical and
material background conditions that have to be in place for
persuasion to be received as the giving of reasons rather than
manipulation.
27
I want to illuminate the "background conditions" of rhetorical
rationality by reconsidering the role of audience. Too often, we assume
that sophistic manipulation reveals the true power of rhetoric to shape the
25. For a more detailed analysis, see MOOTZ, RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note
20.
26. GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, supra note 1, at 6. Garver explains that
the Rhetoric
has little to say about the institutional conditions in which rational friendship
can flourish, as opposed to circumstances that invite a hermeneutics of
suspicion or a rationality fit for bargaining with strangers.... An account of
practical reason has to have room for the intellectual virtue of listening to
people who know more than I do, intelligently binding oneself to authority.
Aristotle's own Ethics and Rhetoric are incomplete because he shows the virtue
of giving good advice, but not of listening to it.
Id. at 129.
27. Id. at 27-28.
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beliefs of an inert (and slightly dull-witted) audience, with rhetorical
rationality being a kinder and gentler exercise of this power. I have
noted that Garver reverses this account by arguing that sophistic
manipulation is parasitical on rhetorical reasoning. Garver suggests that
an audience actively permits itself to be persuaded, and that even in the
case of sophistic "the audience's rational faculty is an active, even if
unknowing, partner in being persuaded., 28  Rhetorical reasoning-
exchanges that I would characterize as giving rise to rhetorical
knowledge-involves an active relationship between speaker and
audience. Sophistic replaces the ethical relationship of argumentation
with the functional relationship of manipulation, which deadens, even if
it does not entirely eliminate, the active audience.
I concur with Garver's suggestion that this account, perhaps
surprisingly, squares with the practice of legal argumentation. Lawyers
who treat judges or opposing counsel as objects to be manipulated rather
than persons to be persuaded are unlikely to be successful. There is more
than a bit of sophistry in lawyering, but it works only to the extent that it
piggybacks on argumentation. Many first year law students-
disappointed when their positivist fantasies are debunked--quickly
conclude that judges have unbridled discretion to decide cases on a
personal whim and then later to supply a plausible legal justification for
their decision. It is not surprising that these same students have
incredible difficulty formulating a coherent argumentative essay for the
final exam. It is easy to indulge the cynical view that law is "mere
rhetoric" when reading a well-crafted opinion, but the tremendous
challenge of addressing a specific legal controversy by arguing
persuasively on behalf of a client quickly demonstrates to students that
rhetorical exchanges are decentering and destabilizing, and therefore do
not easily suffer subject-driven assertions of sophistic power. In short,
one's audience is not an inert object, but rather a partner in the
persuasion.
It is commonplace to acknowledge that rhetoric builds community,
but it is perhaps more accurate to say that a community of political
friendship makes possible the rhetorical engagement that can produce
rhetorical knowledge, which in turn nourishes our communal life. Over
hundreds of years America has developed legal institutions and practices
that structure the community of legal argumentation and also play an
important role in the maintenance of civic life. For example, Robert
Burns suggests that the American jury trial is carefully orchestrated to
promote practical knowledge about what to do in response to a social
disruption; critics who charge that trials are ineffective at getting at the
28. Id. at 64.
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empirical "truth" of the matter in dispute simply miss the point of the
rhetorical exercise of trying a case.29
Legal argumentation vividly demonstrates that rhetorical knowledge
emerges only through active engagements with multilayered
communities. Lawyers arguing a case or negotiating a contract are
rhetorically bound to their adversaries as an active audience, engaged in
a deliberative give-and-take that seeks a solution to some form of
disruption. Lawyers zealously represent their clients' interests, but only
an incompetent lawyer would select a desired result at the beginning of
the representation and then doggedly pursue that goal at all costs.
Rhetorical knowledge emerges through the efforts to persuade various
audiences of the legitimacy of the client's best interests, and good
lawyers use this knowledge to continually reassess their client's best
interests in consultative deliberation with the client, determining how the
legal system might plausibly be used to maximize these interests.
Lawyers also engage the wider community dialogically, as it is
expressed through norms, worldviews and socializing imperatives.
Celebrated cases, reported widely in the mass media and even televised
live, exemplify the role of law in shaping communal norms and the role
of communal norms in shaping legal practice, but this relationship is
ubiquitous in law. Garver is mistaken when he asserts that contract
disputes are more easily resolved than constitutional litigation because
the court needs only to resolve the meaning of the contract for the parties
before the court. 30 The common law of consensual obligation says much
about our view of individual autonomy and social responsibility, and the
resolution of every contract dispute reaffirms or challenges foundational
communal norms no less important than those embodied in the
Constitution. As a result, the advocate's rhetorical construction of the
case will not be persuasive unless she is hermeneutically sensitive to the
underlying social framework. This competency is part of the sensus
communis of practicing lawyers.
C. Rhetorical Knowledge and the Hermeneutic Ethic
Rhetorical knowledge is distinguished from sophistic by the ethical
relationship between speaker and audience, a relationship marked by
activity by both parties rather than the passive reception of information
flowing in one direction. But this seems curious, if not incoherent: what
does it mean to attempt to persuade someone while exhibiting character
and treating the other ethically? Garver solves the problem by restating
29. ROBERT P. Bums, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999).
30. GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, supra note 1, at 157.
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it, inasmuch as he concludes that persuasion is the product of an ethical
relationship when it is rooted in argument rather than logical compulsion
or sophistic manipulation.3' But this does not help us to characterize the
nature of persuasive argumentation that exhibits the ethos required for
rhetorical knowledge.
We gain clarity by acknowledging the hermeneutical dimension of
rhetorical practices, a dimension that is implicit in Garver's attention to
the active role of audience. Hans-Georg Gadamer's investigations into
the varied practices of human understanding led him to a conclusion that
is deceptively simple:
hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not as an absolute position
but as a way of experience. It insists that there is no higher principle
than holding oneself open in conversation. But this means: Always
recognize in advance the possible correctness, even the superiority, of
the conversation partner's position.
32
This so-called "hermeneutic ethic" explains how one might seek to
persuade another person within the context of an ethical relationship
founded on argument rather than manipulation. A relationship founded
on argumentation just means a relationship that is negotiated on the basis
of the probable, and therefore is open to reconsideration. A rhetor
engenders an ethical relationship with her audience when she seeks to
persuade despite the lack of a logically compelling proof, thus holding
herself open to counter-arguments. If the rhetor seeks to gain adherence
without placing her beliefs at risk, she is engaged in a sophistic effort to
secure a desired response rather than a rhetorical effort to persuade.
There can be no rhetorical knowledge in such circumstances; there can
only be rhetorical technique that is measured by its effectiveness in
motivating the audience to act in a desired manner. Gadamer concludes
that the hermeneutical ethic is an ethic of openness to dialogic
experience that permits non-logical truths to emerge. "The
hermeneutical consciousness culminates not in methodological sureness
of itself, but in the readiness for experience that distinguishes the
experienced man from the man captivated by dogma.,
33
31. Arguing that when "the connection between reason and character is severed, the
definitive resolutions of the mathematicians and the mere battle of interest and power are
the only alternatives," Garver extols "a civic and rhetorical ethos of putting reason first."
Id. at 1, 12. "Only by limiting myself to argument can I have ethical relations with my
audience, since the only rational form of ethos is one created through argument." Id. at
54.
32. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics, in
PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHIPS 189 (Robert R. Sullivan trans., MIT Press 1977).
33. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 362 (Joel Weinshiemer and
Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroad 2d rev. ed., 1992).
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Garver's "active audience" is a hermeneutically-attuned audience
prepared to be persuaded by argument. But the rhetor must be no less
hermeneutically-attuned if there is to be an ethical relationship that can
result in rhetorical knowledge. Drawing a line between rhetoric as the
art of speaking and hermeneutics as the art of listening risks reducing
rhetoric to mere technique. Understanding that speaker and audience
both are engaged in a rhetorical-hermeneutical relationship avoids the
pitfall of this dichotomy by recognizing the ethical contours of a dialogic
relationship that gives rise to rhetorical knowledge. The political
friendship that makes rhetorical knowledge possible arises when the
rhetor seeks to persuade the audience through argument and stands ready
to listen to counter-arguments.
The unique role of the TRC in building a democratic South Africa
can be explained in part along these lines. Although many details of the
apartheid regime were exposed by the TRC's work, the participants told
multiple stories that did not fit into a seamless accounting of past events
that merely needed to be voiced. The important contribution of the TRC
was its contribution to rhetorical knowledge, knowledge that is civic,
social and political in character. The negotiated settlement between the
warring parties rejected both a general amnesty and state-sanctioned
vengeance, and the parties created the TRC to move the country forward
as a diverse, even divided, democratic community. Professor Salazar's
characterization of the TRC's rhetorical significance in pursuing this
goal suggests that the TRC's success may derive in part from
institutionalizing political friendship through hermeneutical
attentiveness.
By affirming differences on issues and accepting that to listen to each
other's arguments is part of this process of affirmation, citizens of a
rhetorical democracy celebrate both the power of dissent and the
power of acceptance; in sum, they celebrate their community as a
rhetorical community.
34
The TRC provided a proto-model of the kind of political friendship that
subtends a democratic community by promoting hermeneutical-rhetorical
argumentation and deliberation.
Admittedly, there is much dissatisfaction in South Africa with the
TRC. A standard historical account suggests that it was a failure because
the races were even more divided by the TRC's conclusions and actions,
due to excessive amnesties for those who engaged in gross violations of
human rights.35  But this same account notes the importance of the
34. SALAZAR, AN AFRICAN ATHENS, supra note 22, at 81.
35. LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 277-78 (Yale Univ. Press 3d
ed. 2000).
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symbolic acts by President Mandela and others to assure the Afrikaner
minority of their place in the emerging democracy.36 Thus, the TRC is
significant for its civic role, accomplished rhetorically, rather than the
judicial role of identifying and punishing crimes. Only time will tell if
this rhetorical role has succeeded. It may be that the rhetorical role of
the TRC will prove to be insufficient in the long run to foster a
democratic society that respects human rights, and that the racial
divisiveness of the apartheid years will overwhelm the democratic
project. But one recent empirical study of the attitudes of South Africans
toward human rights and the rule of law that has pessimistic overtones
also notes the contributions of the TRC to fostering a democratic
culture. 37  The TRC is not significant because it exemplified the
application of neutral principles necessary to cultivate a culture of human
rights; in fact, the TRC's relaxed procedures and generous amnesty may
have undermined the development of rule of law consciousness.
However, the rhetorical legacy of the TRC, in which deeply contested
realities were heard and mediated, might have profound and lasting
significance.
The South African legal system will have to carry forward the
rhetorical work of the TRC. Democracy is sustained by rhetorical
engagement in an institutional context that prevents raw majoritarianism,
rather than by sophistic manipulation by those who hold power.39 In
America, there is reason to believe that a rhetorical-hermeneutical
engagement might work through what Chaim Perelman would call our
36. Id. at 274.
37. James L. Gibson, Truth, Reconciliation, and the Creation of a Human Rights
Culture in South Africa, 38 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 1 (2004). James Gibson's research
leads him to conclude the following:
Those who have not learned the complex lessons of democracy have also failed
to learn about the importance of the rule of law.... I suspect that some South
Africans view law as a means by which whites maintain their hegemony in
South Africa. If so, this is an important, and ominous, finding....
... It may well be that since South Africans have had little experience with
legal universalism, they have yet to learn of its value. The TRC seems to have
had some influence on attitudes toward law, although I admit that the evidence
of causality is not as strong as it might be. By exposing people to the
consequences of arbitrary government not constrained by law and by judging
all sides in the struggle according to the same criteria, the truth and
reconciliation process may have deepened and widened respect for law.
Id. at33.
38. Id. at 21, 24-25.
39. Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts in the Field of Power Politics:
Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1861, 1871-83
(2004) (arguing that South African constitutionalism appears to be accomplishing this
goal).
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"confused notions" of equality and fairness in resolving the problem of
affirmative action. The South African experiment is more dramatic, far-
reaching and perilous, but the TRC also points the way toward the
institutionalization of a rhetoric that recognizes the hermeneutical value
of listening, and it provides a signpost for an emerging democratic legal
culture that must carry the heavy baggage of racial balkanization.
III. Conclusion
My theory of rhetorical knowledge works from Garver's insights
and provides a more complete account of legal rhetoric by illuminating
the hermeneutical character of the active audience. Rhetorical
knowledge is epistemic, which means that it is not just an internally-
coherent rational practice that can be pressed into service in furtherance
of politics or ethics, but rather is a practical activity in which political
and ethical knowledge is acquired. Garver's Aristotelian approach to
rhetoric preserves the integrity of the practice against the age-old
challenge of the sophists, but he does not go far enough. Rhetorical-
hermeneutical practices generate rhetorical knowledge, particularly in the
legal sphere, and it is imperative to investigate the social and institutional
conditions for fostering such practices.
By way of conclusion, it might pay to recall that Gadamer begins
his magnum opus with an excerpt from Rilke that captures the power of
hermeneutical understanding through a fusion of horizons. This excerpt
might also be read as a parable of the source of the power of rhetorical-
hermeneutical engagement when speaker and audience extend political
friendship to each other, as well as a caution against the sophistic efforts
of an insular speaker.
Catch only what you've thrown yourself, all is
mere skill and little gain;
but when you're suddenly the catcher of a ball
thrown by an eternal partner
with accurate and measured swing
towards you, to your center, in an arch
from the great bridgebuilding of God:
why catching then becomes a power-
not yours, a world's.
-Rainer Maria Rilke
40
40. Quoted as the epigraph in GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 33.
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